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PREFACE 
The classical theory of games is concerned with the study of competitive (or cooperative) situations 
in which at least wo players are involved. The classical paradigm of game theory envisages a static 
situation in which each player decides on his "optimal" move, based on the complete description 
of (i.e. information on) the game that is available to the players. In the multi-stage extension each 
player has recourse to an optimal sequence of moves that has been planned prior to the "playout" 
of the game and that is based on optimally using one's initial resources and one's complete 
information on the game. In the dynamic situation (with complete information), the situation is 
reassessed by the players at each stage of the game. Thus, at each stage, as the game is played out, 
the information on the actual realized state of the game is incorporated into the players' strategies. 
As before, the optimal strategy is designed to optimize one's performance index, which is defined 
on the whole time horizon of the game; however, the periodic measurement of one's "position" 
and the ensuing (updated) optimal strategy then allow the player to exploit fully a previously 
committed error by his or her adversary. 
The twenty papers in the present issue are devoted to the treatment of a wide spectrum of 
problems in the theory and applications of dynamic games; however, emphasis is placed on 
pursuit-evasion games. Specifically, the paper by Basar and Kumar is concerned with a dynamic 
game theoretical pproach to worst-case design. In another vein, the paper by Lai and Tanaka is 
devoted to the analysis of an n-person oncooperative dynamic game where the process is stopped 
when the state enters a prespecified subset of the state space. Furthermore, in the paper by 
Bernhard et al. the interesting instance of the onset of mixed strategies in a dynamic game setting 
is analyzed. 
The case where the dynamic system in the dynamic game is modelled by a (controlled) differential 
equation is referred to as a differential game, and the remaining sixteen papers in this issue are 
concerned with differential games. The emphasis here is on pursuit-evasion differential games; the 
only notable exception in this respect being the paper by Aihara and Bagchi where the infinite 
dimensional extension is treated. In addition, in the above-mentioned paper the important situation 
where both players have access to different measurements (of the state) is treated. 
Pursuit-evasion differential games with noise-corrupted or incomplete observations are discussed 
in the papers by Yavin (where intentional deception is incorporated in the model) and Chan 
respectively. Furthermore, a second paper by Yavin addresses the stochastic two-target 
pursuit-evasion differential game encounter with three players. Finally, the paper by Galperin and 
Skowronski advocates a "deterministic" approach to uncertainty in differential games, whereas in 
the paper by Corless, Leitmann and Skowronski ideas from adaptive control are brought o bear 
on avoidance and evasion in an uncertain environment. 
The paper by Pachter and Miloh is concerned with a detailed protocol for the construction of 
the barrier surface, thereby delineating the regions of win of either player and hence solving the 
qualitative "game of kind". The paper by Gutman, Esh and Gefen advocates an alternative 
approach to capturability that encompasses the solution of an auxiliary quantitative differential 
game with terminal pay-off. 
The following papers treat various extensions of the classical differential games: Ardema and 
Rajan consider (aircraft) pursuit-evasion in three dimensions, the case of variable speed is treated 
in the paper by Prasad and Rajan, and the paper by Pachter is concerned with a state-constrained 
differential game. An additional important extension is concerned with the capture of the combat 
aspect in pursuit-evasion; thus, in certain configurations an (armed) evader can turn into a pursuer, 
thereby reversing the roles of pursuer/evader. Also, the evader is then endowed with a capture 
set, and in the papers by Skowronski and Stonier and Shinar and Davidovitz two-target 
pursuit-evasion differential games are considered. 
The following papers are more oriented towards applications. The paper by Merz considers a
(stochastic) satellite pursuit-evasion scenario. The papers by Jfirmark and by Moritz, Polis and 
Well are centered on the aerial combat problem, and due attention is given to computational 
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methods for the solution of differential games. The paper by Rodin et al. discusses a general 
framework based on AI concepts for the integration of a number of pursuit-evasion algorithms 
in air combat. 
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